DETAILED REPORT OF THE WSOC CONFERENCE HELD IN ISTANBUL FROM 06 OCT TO 08 OCT 2026

IATA WSOC CONFERENCE: OPERATIONS & CABIN OPS

PART III – OPERATIONS TRACK





1. Day One – 6 October 2026

Session 1: ATM in the Digital Age – Building the Next-Generation Workforce

Time: 14:00–15:20

Participants:

- Cherif Ka – IATA (Moderator)
- Eduardo Garcia – CANSO
- John Franklin – EASA

1.1 The Session examined how digital transformation is fundamentally changing the role of Air Traffic Controllers and the future structure of Air Traffic Management.

1.2 Traditionally, Controllers have been responsible for **maintaining aircraft separation and managing traffic** within defined sectors. However, increasing traffic volumes, automated decision-support systems and evolving airspace structures are changing the competencies required of future ATM professionals.

1.3 The discussion programme concentrated on three areas.

A. **Digital Transformation of ATM**

The transition towards increasingly digital ATM environments requires personnel capable of interpreting integrated information, managing automated systems and responding to situations where technology cannot provide an adequate solution.

B. **Training and Licensing Reforms**

The programme examined how regulators should adapt training and licensing frameworks to changing operational responsibilities.

This raises questions concerning competency-based training, recurrent assessment and maintaining proficiency when automated systems perform an increasing proportion of routine tasks.

C. **Attracting and Retaining Aviation Professionals**

Aviation must attract younger professionals while **retaining experienced personnel** capable of mentoring new entrants.

1.4 The challenge is not simply recruitment but ensuring that the next generation possesses both **Technological Competence and Sound Operational Judgement**.

1.5 **Relevance to India: AAI, DGCA and Training Institutions should examine how future ATM training can accommodate increasing traffic density, Automation and the Integration of New Airspace users.**

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2. Session 2: Geopolitics and Airspace Resilience – Navigating Complexities

Time: 16:10–17:30

Participants:

- Rory Sergison – IATA (Moderator)
- Hossam Abougabal – Qatar Airways

- Chris Myers – Abu Dhabi Airport

2.1 This was among the most Operationally relevant sessions for International Airlines. The programme examined how geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts and regulatory fragmentation are changing Global Flight Operations. The principal discussion areas included:

a) **Airspace Closures and Restrictions**: Airlines increasingly face sudden changes to available routes. These affect Flight Planning, connectivity, Operational Continuity and Coordination between States.
b) **Strategic Route Planning**: Airlines must balance Safety, Security, Economic considerations and Sustainability when Evaluating alternative routes.
c) **International Cooperation**: The programme highlighted the importance of information sharing and coordinated crisis response between Airlines, Airports, Regulators and Air Navigation Service providers.
d) **Operational Resilience**: An Airline must retain the ability to continue safe Operations when its established route network is disrupted.

2.2 ***For Flight Crews, these subjects have practical implications for Fuel planning, Alternate selection, Operational briefings and diversion preparedness.***

2.2.1 **FIP recommendation would be to seek structured pilot input when airlines develop procedures for Operating near Conflict-affected Airspaces.**

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3. **Day Two – 07 October 2026**

Session 3: People-Driven Fuel Efficiency

Time: 09:00–10:20

This was an important session because it placed Flight Crews and Operational personnel at the centre of Fuel-efficiency programmes.

Speakers and Panellists:

Participant	Organisation
• Hélène Manzoni	• IATA – Introduction
• Capt. Okan Ergen	• Turkish Airlines
• Capt. Caio Rosante Garcia	• Azul Airlines
• Capt. David McCutcheon	• Qantas Freight – Moderator
• Sanad Shahaltough	• Qatar Airways

3.1 The Session examined how airlines are improving fuel efficiency through operational strategies, data-driven decisions and cooperation between Departments.

The published agenda emphasised that fuel-efficiency improvements are not solely technical achievements. They also depend on Operational culture and the decisions made by Aviation Professionals.

Operational implications

3.2 An effective fuel-efficiency programme requires cooperation between Flight Operations, Dispatch, Engineering, Air Traffic Management and Airline Management. Relevant areas for Airlines to examine include Flight Planning, Aircraft Performance, Route Optimisation, unnecessary fuel burn and the use of operational data to identify opportunities for improvement. However, efficiency measures must remain subordinate to Safety requirements.

3.3 For example, fuel-saving Objectives must not compromise a Commander's discretion to carry additional fuel when justified by weather, congestion, operational uncertainty or other Safety considerations.

3.4 **Suggested FIP Position**: Fuel-efficiency programmes should encourage informed pilot participation rather than impose rigid performance targets that could create inappropriate Operational pressure.

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4. **Session 4: Advanced Air Mobility – From Concept to Operations**

Time: 11:10–12:30

Participants included:

- Chris Kempis – Former Director Flight Operations, Cathay Pacific (Moderator)
- Wayne Cummings – FAA
- Chris Collins – Delta
- Nancy Gao – EHANG
- Francesco Gaetani – EASA

4.1 The Session examined the transition of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) from Technological development towards practical Commercial Operations. AAM includes Emerging Aircraft and Operating models, such as electric vertical take-off and landing aircraft. The programme focused on Certification and Operational timelines, Regulatory expectations, Risk management and Cooperation between Manufacturers, Airlines and Regulators. A central challenge is integrating these Aircraft safely into existing aviation infrastructure without compromising conventional aircraft operations.

Implications for India

4.2 India will need to consider several Regulatory and Operational questions as AAM develops:

- Certification and Continuing Airworthiness.

- Licensing and competency requirements for Operators.
- Integration into Controlled and Uncontrolled Airspace.
- Coordination with existing ATC systems.
- Infrastructure and emergency-response arrangements.
- Operational Risk Assessment.

4.3 **These are Recommended areas for Indian Regulatory consideration, not Decisions announced by the Conference**.

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5. **Session 5: Performance-Based Framework for People Competency Development**

Time: 14:00–15:20

This Session is particularly relevant to FIP's work concerning pilot Training Standards.

Participants:

- Andres Ospina – IATA (Moderator)
- Capt. David McCutcheon – Qantas Freight
- Capt. Ascanio Russo – EASA
- Dr. Mizuki Urano – Aviation Safety Advocate and Flight Attendant CBTA Subject Matter Expert

5.1 The Programme examined the future of Performance-based frameworks and competency-based training. Traditional Aviation Training has often relied on completing prescribed exercises, meeting Minimum requirements and passing standardised assessments.

5.2 Competency-based approaches place greater emphasis on whether a trainee can demonstrate the knowledge, skills and attitudes required to perform operational duties safely. The discussion addressed regulatory evolution, international harmonisation and the future competency requirements of Aviation Professionals.

Why this Matters for Pilot Training?

5.3 A competency-based approach should assess the Pilot's ability to:

- Recognise and Manage Threats.
- Maintain Situational Awareness.
- Exercise Sound Judgement.
- Communicate and Coordinate effectively.
- Manage Workload.
- Respond to Unexpected Situations.

- Apply Procedures Appropriately.

5.4 Important distinction for India's CPL training: Competency-based Training should strengthen training quality; it does not automatically justify reducing minimum flying experience. FIP recommends competency-based approach training which can support modern Competency Assessment while maintaining its position. We do not recommend reduction in the Flying Training Syllabus.

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6. **Session 6: Building a Resilient Workforce for Safe, Effective and Efficient Operations**

Time: 16:10–17:30

Participants:

- Andres Ospina – IATA (Moderator)
- Capt. Fatih Rüştü Altunok – Turkish Airlines
- Capt. Yizhi Zhou – China Southern Airlines
- Neil Dasgupta – British Airways

6.1 The programme examined how Airlines and Training Organisations can prepare their personnel for future Operational challenges. The central areas were data, innovation, competency-based approaches, workforce adaptability and resilience. This subject extends **beyond initial Pilot Qualification**.

6.2 Airline training must prepare professionals to operate effectively throughout their careers as Aircraft Systems, Operating Environments and Procedures change.

Practical Considerations for India

6.3 Training organisations should examine whether their recurrent programmes adequately develop Decision-making, Adaptability and the ability to manage unfamiliar situations. Another important consideration is the retention of experienced Instructors and Operational personnel.

6.4 A resilient workforce requires a combination of Experience, Technical Knowledge, Professional Judgement and the ability to learn from Operational events.

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7. **Day Three – 8 October 2026**

Session 7: Navigating the Digital Transition in Aviation Meteorology

Time: 09:00–10:20

7.1 This session examined a major transformation in the way meteorological information will be generated, distributed and used in flight operations.

Participants included:

- Jiska Manicus – IATA (Moderator)

- Arnold Tafferner – Wx Fusion GmbH
- Alex Holt – Viasat
- Peter Clemmow – Cathay Pacific
- Enrique Cano – SITA

7.2 The programme explained that ICAO has been working towards converting traditional Meteorological products—including METAR, TAF and SIGMET—from conventional text-based formats into structured digital datasets. The objective is to facilitate machine-to-machine transmission and allow aviation systems to process meteorological information more efficiently.

7.3 **Major Discussion Areas**

A. **Digital Weather Information**

Future Flight Planning systems will increasingly be able to receive and process updated meteorological information automatically.

B. **Changing Flight briefing practices**

The programme specifically questioned what flight preparation might look like without the conventional Weather briefing package that has been familiar to Aviation professionals for decades.

C. **Operational Decision-making**

Digital weather systems offer opportunities for better information integration, but pilots must still be able to interpret meteorological risks and exercise independent judgement.

D. **Implementation challenges**

7.4 The transition requires compatibility between Airlines, Meteorological service providers, Flight Planning systems and Regulatory requirements.

Importance for India

7.5 For India, this has implications for IMD, AAI, DGCA, flight dispatchers and pilot Training Organisations.

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8. **Session 8: Solving Data Fragmentation with the Performance Information Exchange Model (PIXM)**

Time: 11:10–12:30

Speakers:

- John Synnott – IATA
- Paul Hanna – PDC Aero

8.1 The final Operations session addressed the problem of fragmented aviation Performance information. Airlines, Aircraft Manufacturers, Airports, Regulators and other Aviation stakeholders frequently use different information systems and data formats. This fragmentation makes it difficult to exchange and interpret operational information consistently.

8.2 The Performance Information Exchange Model (PIXM) was presented as a common framework for exchanging performance-related information. The programme identified four priorities:

- Converting existing standards into a common information framework.
- Addressing gaps between existing systems.
- Improving cooperation across technical disciplines.
- Developing and implementing the model in phases.

Importance for India

8.3 The potential benefit is more consistent and efficient exchange of operational information across the aviation ecosystem. For **Pilots and Flight Dispatchers**, better **data integration** could eventually improve the consistency of information used for flight planning and operational decisions.

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PART II – CABIN OPERATIONS TRACK





9. The Cabin Operations track was especially comprehensive. It addressed eight dedicated sessions covering **Regulatory developments, Passenger Safety Communication, Medical emergencies, Cabin Crew performance, Lithium Batteries, Unruly Passengers and future industry priorities.**

A recurring theme was the recognition that cabin crew are safety professionals whose responsibilities extend well beyond passenger service.

10. **Day One – 6 October 2026**

Session 1: Regulatory Update

Time: 14:00–15:20

Participants:

Speaker	Organisation
• Jonathan Jasper	IATA
• Rachel Park	Cathay Pacific Airways
• David Moldskred	Civil Aviation Authority of Norway
• Michael Givens	FAA

10.1 The session provided an update on activities undertaken by IATA, ICAO and aviation regulators concerning cabin safety. The purpose was to improve awareness of regulatory developments and facilitate industry understanding of evolving cabin safety requirements.

Significance

10.2 Cabin Safety is governed by a combination of international standards, national regulations, Aircraft-specific procedures and Airline Operating Manuals. Differences in regulatory interpretation can create difficulties for international operators. Regulatory coordination is therefore important in maintaining consistent safety practices across airlines and jurisdictions.

10.3 **For India**, this highlights the importance of periodically reviewing DGCA's **Cabin Safety requirements against ICAO provisions and established international operating practices.**

11**. Session 2: Cabin Safety Bazaar**

Time: 16:10–17:30

11.1 This was an interactive session involving delegates and members of the IATA Cabin Operations Safety Task Force.

Moderator: Matt Whipp, Head of Cabin Safety, British Airways.

Participating representatives included Delta Air Lines, Turkish Airlines, ITA Airways and Qantas.

11.2 Unlike a conventional presentation, the Bazaar format was designed to facilitate rapid exchanges and practical discussions across a wide range of cabin safety subjects. Its purpose was to allow airlines to share operational experience, identify common difficulties and learn from one another. This format is particularly useful because many cabin safety challenges are not unique to individual airlines.

11.3 **A safety problem encountered by one operator may provide valuable preventive lessons for the wider industry**.

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12. **Day Two – 7 October 2026**

Session 3: Educating and Informing Passengers

Time: 09:00–10:20

This was one of the most significant passenger-facing subjects in the Cabin Operations track.

Participants:

- Jay Lee – United Airlines (Moderator)
- Trisha Ferguson – The Interaction Group
- John Franklin – EASA
- Elise May – UL Standards & Engagement

12.1 The session was based on the principle that onboard safety is a shared responsibility between passengers and cabin crew. The central question was how airlines can communicate essential safety information in a manner that passengers understand, remember and follow.

Key issues examined

12.2 Passenger attention and comprehension

a) Airline Passengers vary considerably in age, language, travel experience and familiarity with aircraft safety procedures.
b) Communicating safety information effectively requires more than merely delivering a mandatory announcement.
c) Consistency of safety messages

12.3 John Franklin of EASA also publicly highlighted the importance of making passenger safety messages simpler and more consistent across the travel experience.

12.4 He referred to EASA's work on nine passenger safety behaviours and the next phase of its Put Yourself in Flight mode campaign. The proposed approach allows airlines to communicate safety information creatively while maintaining consistency in the essential behaviours passengers are expected to understand.

Encouraging Passenger Compliance

12.5 The programme emphasised that safety communication should encourage passengers to follow instructions, not merely satisfy a regulatory requirement.

12.6 **This has practical implications for safety demonstrations, cabin announcements and passenger engagement**.

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12.7 **Recommended consideration for Indian Airlines**

Safety demonstrations should be periodically assessed for Passenger comprehension, particularly in a multilingual operating environment.

13. **Session 4: Medical Response**

Time: 11:10–12:30

Participants:

- Carol Lauinger – WestJet (Moderator)
- Dr Bryan McCarty – MD Onboard
- Felix Brand – CardioSecur
- Eric Dinear Tampal – Qatar Airways

13.1 This session examined how inflight medical response is evolving towards integrated, data-driven systems. Medical emergencies present particular challenges because cabin crew must provide immediate assistance in a restricted environment, frequently with limited medical resources. At the same time, **Flight Crews may need to make time-critical Operational decisions.**

13.2 **Operational Areas arising from this Subject**

a) **Initial Medical Assessment**: Cabin crew must be able to recognise medical emergencies and provide appropriate assistance within their training and authorisation.
b) **Ground-based Medical Support**: **Communication with specialist** medical services can help crews assess the seriousness of an event.
c) **Medical Information and Technology**: Emerging systems may improve the transmission and **interpretation of Medical Information**.
d) **Flight Deck Coordination**: Medical information must be communicated clearly so that the commander can make an informed decision concerning Diversion or continuation.

13.3 **A useful training implication is that airlines should conduct integrated Cockpit-Cabin medical emergency exercises rather than treating medical response exclusively as a Cabin Crew responsibility.**

13.4 **Recommendations for Medical Response**

- Strengthening & Standardised In-Flight Medical Emergency Response
- Medical Emergency Reporting Database
- Crew Mental Health and Medical Fitness
- Enhanced Cabin Crew Medical Recurrent Training
- Standardisation of Onboard Medical Equipment
- Ground-Based Medical Support
- Medical Diversion Protocols
- Medical Emergencies Involving Operating Crew
- Post-Incident Reporting and Analysis
- Technology-enabled medical assessment
- Medical Readiness at Airports
- Joint Emergency Response Exercises

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14. **Session 5: Focus on Cabin Crew**

Time: 14:00–15:20

This session examined how airline safety managers can support cabin crew in performing their increasingly complex responsibilities.

Participants:

- Cari Smith-Allen – American Airlines (Moderator)
- Severine Guitton – HOP!
- Sasa Janine Leal Tennberg – Air Europa
- Jessy Jones – Gulf Air

14.1 The programme recognised the simultaneous responsibilities of cabin crew for safety, security and passenger service. It examined how cabin safety management must adapt to changing operational conditions. The inclusion of Air Europa's Fatigue

Risk Manager was particularly relevant to the wider human-performance theme of WSOC 2026.

Implications for Cabin Crew Fatigue Management

14.2 Cabin crew fatigue deserves systematic attention because cabin crew must remain capable of responding effectively to emergencies throughout a duty period. Relevant considerations for airlines include roster design, night operations, extended duties, recovery opportunities and the cumulative effects of operational disruption.

14.3 These are areas for applying the session's **human-performance theme**, rather than specific resolutions attributed to the panellists.

14.4 **For India, the broader policy implication is that fatigue-related safety assessment should include *Cabin Crew as well as Pilots*.**

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15. Session 6: Focus on Lithium Batteries

Time: 16:10–17:30

15.1 This was one of the most important technical safety subjects in the Cabin Operations programme.

Participants:

- Julia Arnds – Lufthansa (Moderator)
- Emily Brimsek – UL Standards & Engagement
- Liang Liang – China Southern Airlines
- Rachid Zine-eddine – AVIA-SEC

15.2 The session addressed continuing changes to regulations and guidance concerning the carriage of Lithium batteries in Aircraft Cabins. It examined the different organisations and factors influencing regulatory decisions, with the objective of improving alignment in industry expectations.

15.3 Why Lithium Batteries require Particular Attention

a) Lithium batteries are carried in numerous passenger devices, including mobile phones, laptops and power banks.
b) Damaged, defective or improperly handled batteries can present fire and thermal-runaway hazards.
c) The subject has implications for passenger information, crew training and emergency response procedures.

15.4 Suggested Operational Priorities

Airlines should regularly review:

- Passenger instructions concerning battery-powered devices.
- Cabin crew training for recognising battery-related incidents.
- Procedures for responding to smoke, overheating and fire.
- Availability and correct use of approved firefighting equipment.

- Communication between cabin crew and the flight deck.
- Consistency between dangerous goods requirements and cabin operating procedures.

15.5 These are **recommended follow-up areas**; the programme does not establish that WSOC adopted a new universal battery-carriage rule.

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16. **Day Three – 8 October 2026**

Session 7: Focus on Unruly Passengers

Time: 09:00–10:20

Participants:

Participant	Organisation
• Frederic Wille – Moderator	KLM
• Anabel Brough	Emirates
• Özlem Çeri	Turkish Airlines
• Shu Zhang	Air China

16.1 The session examined global trends in unruly passenger incidents, changes in passenger behaviour and measures for reducing the associated risks. This is an important operational safety issue because unruly passengers can interfere with Cabin Crew duties, create Security concerns and, in serious cases, affect Flight Safety.

16.2 **Areas of Particular Significance**

a) Behavioural trends: Understanding the nature and frequency of incidents helps airlines develop appropriate preventive measures.
b) Early identification: Crew members need the skills to recognise escalating behaviour before it develops into a serious incident.
c) Crew coordination: Effective communication between cabin crew, the senior cabin crew member and the commander is essential.
d) Incident management: Airline procedures should support safe de-escalation, appropriate intervention and accurate reporting.
e) Organisational support: Cabin crew must have confidence that their employer will support appropriate safety-related decisions.

Importance for India

16.3 This subject merits particular attention given the operational and security implications of disruptive passenger behaviour. A coordinated approach involving airlines, airport security agencies and regulators would help establish consistent preventive and response practices.

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17. **Session 8: What Next? – Future Cabin Safety Priorities**

Time: 11:10–12:30

17.1 The final Cabin Operations session reviewed the issues raised during the conference and considered opportunities for cooperation during 2027.

Participants:

- Jonathan Jasper – IATA (Moderator)
- Stephane Soum – Air France
- Turgut Kendirci – Turkish Airlines
- Kathrin Thielbeer – Airbus

17.2 The objective was to identify how airlines, manufacturers and other stakeholders could work together on emerging cabin safety issues. The published programme does not provide a final list of formally adopted recommendations from this session.

17.3 Nevertheless, the preceding discussions identify several subjects that would warrant continued industry attention: **Passenger Safety communication, Lithium batteries, Cabin Crew Performance, Medical Response, Unruly Passengers and Regulatory harmonisation.**

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PART I – SAFETY TRACK





21. **Day One – 06 October 2026**

Session 1: Safety Launch

Time: 14:00–15:20

21.1 The opening Safety session was designed as an interactive discussion between industry experts and delegates, focusing on the most pressing aviation safety challenges and the industry's future priorities.

Speakers and participants

Name	Organisation
• Mark Searle – Moderator	• IATA, Global Director Safety
• Colin Russell – Opening presentation	• Flexjet Operations
• Chris Collins	• Delta Air Lines
• Francesco Gaetani	• EASA
• Yannick Vanhaecke	• Airbus

21.2 Colin Russell opened the track with a deliberately provocative presentation questioning whether confidence in existing safety systems is always justified. The programme encouraged delegates to challenge established assumptions rather than simply accept that existing safety performance demonstrates adequate protection.

21.3 **Major Areas of Discussions**

A. ***Is the aviation industry becoming complacent***?

Aviation has achieved substantial improvements in safety performance, but low accident rates can sometimes create a misleading perception that existing systems are sufficiently robust.

A. A meaningful **Safety Assessment** should therefore examine weak signals, operational deviations and emerging risks—not merely the absence of accidents.

B. Moving beyond reactive **Safety Management**

Aviation organisations must increasingly identify conditions that could contribute to an accident before a serious occurrence exposes them.

This requires effective reporting systems, operational data analysis, hazard identification and Continuous monitoring.

C. **Safety as a Shared Responsibility**

Manufacturers, airlines, regulators and operational personnel must exchange information rather than manage risks in organisational isolation.

22. **Implications for FIP: Pilot Safety reports, Technical Observations and operational experience should be treated as valuable sources of safety Intelligence and incorporated into structured Risk-assessment processes.**

23. **Session 2: Human-Centered Safety – Real-World Human Factors in Action**

Time: 16:10–17:30

This session examined how human performance is shaped by the Operational Environment in which people work.

Participants

- Andrew Larsen – Transport Canada (Facilitator)
- Jessica Nichols – Air services Australia
- Laurie Shaw – Cor Nexus
- Dr Björn Hennig – Avialytics GmbH

23.1 The session sought to demonstrate how human factors influence everyday operational decisions and safety outcomes.

23.2 **Major areas examined**

a) **Understanding why people act as they do**
Traditional investigations frequently concentrate on identifying an individual's error. A human-centred approach also examines the surrounding circumstances. For example, when a Pilot makes an incorrect selection, an effective investigation should consider workload, cockpit design, available information, time pressure, Training and Organisational influences.

b) **Human Performance within Complex Systems**
People do not operate independently of their environment. Their performance is influenced by equipment, procedures, management decisions and interactions with other personnel.

c) **Understanding Normal Operations**
Studying how pilots, controllers and engineers successfully manage routine operational variability can reveal important safety strengths that may not be visible through accident investigations alone.

d) **Practical Human-factors Improvements**
The programme emphasised applying human-factors knowledge to real operational situations rather than treating it as a theoretical training subject.

23.3 **Significance for India**

This discussion supports a more comprehensive approach to accident and incident investigation, including the examination of Organisational and systemic contributors alongside individual actions.

24. **Day Two – 07 October 2026**

Session 3: The Margin of Maneuver – Aligning Risk Appetite with Human Performance

Time: 09:00–10:20

This was among the most important policy-oriented discussions in the Safety track.

Participants

Name	**Organisation**
James Coventry – Introductory presentation	WTW
Matt Lillywhite – Moderator	IATA
Dr Marie Langer	Langer Aer Solutions
Lori Northcott	Boeing
Peter Clemmow	Cathay Pacific

James Coventry's presentation was titled What Risk? Acceptable to Whom?... and Who Decides?

24.1 The central issue was how aviation organisations determine the level of risk they are prepared to accept and whether those decisions adequately reflect human performance.

24.2 **Important questions raised**

a) **Who decides what constitutes acceptable risk?**
b) An airline's commercial management, Safety department, Pilots and Regulators may view the same Operational Risk differently.
c) The programme examined whether organisations have a common understanding of risk appetite and tolerability.
d) **How much operational flexibility should be permitted**?

e) Operational flexibility is essential, but the boundaries of acceptable risk must be clearly understood.
f) **Are Risk Assessments sufficiently realistic?**
g) A numerical risk assessment may not adequately represent the uncertainty, time pressure and human-performance limitations encountered in actual operations.

Practical implications

24.3 This discussion is particularly relevant to:

a) Flight dispatch decisions during adverse weather.

b) Fuel planning and diversion decisions.

c) Flight Duty Time Limitations.

d) Operating near conflict-affected airspace.

e) Commercial pressure and operational decision-making.

f) Acceptance of recurring procedural deviations.

24.4 FIP position: Safety-critical decisions should incorporate the professional judgement of operational personnel. Commercial objectives **must not undermine a commander's authority to make conservative safety decisions**.

25. **Session 4: Navigating Complexity – Future-Proofing Aviation Safety Talent**

Time: 11:10–12:30

Participants

- Chris Bowden – HAECO, introductory presentation
- Dragos Munteanu – IATA (Moderator)
- Rich Allen-Williams – British Airways
- Karim Atta – Bee Future Aviators

This session examined the competencies that future Aviation Safety professionals will require as the industry becomes more technologically sophisticated.

25.1 **Principal Themes**

a) **Changing nature of Aviation Safety Expertise**
- Safety professionals increasingly need to understand operational data, automation, human-machine interaction and emerging technological risks.

b) **Loss of Institutional Experience**
- As experienced aviation professionals retire, organisations risk losing valuable operational knowledge and investigative experience.

c) **Mentoring and Professional Development**

- Training should combine technical education with practical operational exposure and mentoring.

d) **Preparing for Complex Safety Challenges**

- The next generation of safety specialists must be capable of evaluating risks that cross traditional departmental boundaries.

25.2 For example, a flight safety issue may involve aircraft systems, software, operational procedures, human performance and organisational decisions simultaneously.

25.3 **Relevance to FIP**

This provides a useful foundation for developing **Advanced Training Programmes** in **Aviation Safety Management, Human Factors, Accident Investigation and Operational Risk Assessment**.

26. **Session 5: People as the Core of the IOSA Programme**

Time: 14:00–15:20

Participants

Name	**Organisation**
• Scott MacKenzie – Moderator	IATA
• Virginie Allard	Air France
• Arzu Yagmurca	IATA, IOSA Auditor
• Andrew Larsen	Transport Canada

26.1 The **IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)** is frequently perceived as a technical and documentation-intensive exercise. This session challenged that perception by examining the importance of human competence, behaviour, communication, leadership and organisational culture in implementing IOSA standards.

26.2 **Main Discussion Areas**

- Documentation versus Operational Reality
- An Airline may possess comprehensive manuals and documented procedures, but their existence does not automatically demonstrate effective safety performance.
- The more important question is whether procedures are understood and consistently applied during actual operations.
- Leadership responsibility
- Senior Management must provide adequate resources, demonstrate commitment to safety and ensure that personnel can raise operational concerns.
- Competency of Operational Personnel.

- Effective implementation depends on trained and competent employees who understand the purpose of safety requirements.
- Risk-based auditing.

The broader **IOSA approach** increasingly emphasises evaluating actual operational risks rather than treating every organisation as having an identical risk profile.

26.3 **Important figures presented in IATA's opening Safety address**

Risk-based IOSA findings

14,000

Approximately identified findings

6,000

Approximately identified observations

January 2025 to 6 October 2026, as reported by IATA.

The purpose of identifying these weaknesses is to enable corrective action before they contribute to an accident.

Mark Searle, IATA Director of Safety +1

27. **Session 6: People-Powered Safety – Driving Innovation Across the Aviation Ecosystem**

Time: 16:10–17:30

This session addressed the relationship between Technological Innovation, Automation and Human Accountability.

Participants included:

- Craig R. Bomben – Boeing, introductory presentation on runway incursion prevention
- Edickson Santamaria – IATA (Moderator)
- Amy Burgum – EasyJet
- Andrea Sack – CANSO
- Ian Witter – ACI Europe
- Dragos Munteanu – IATA, Airport Assessment Service presentation

27.1 **Major discussion areas**

- Preventing Runway Incursions
- Runway Safety requires coordinated action by pilots, controllers, airport operators and ground personnel.
- Technology can provide enhanced situational awareness, but clear communication and compliance with procedures remain essential.
- Avoiding excessive reliance on Automation

- As technology assumes more routine functions, aviation personnel must retain sufficient knowledge and skills to intervene when systems fail or produce misleading information.
- Human accountability
- Automation should not create uncertainty concerning who is responsible for a safety-critical decision.
- Airport Safety assessments
- The session also included a presentation on IATA's Airport Assessment Service Project.

27.2 **Additional observation from Mark Searle**

In his opening address, Searle highlighted the danger of small deviations from standard operating practices gradually becoming accepted. He referred particularly to abbreviated or non-standard communication and emphasised the importance of the Joint Runway Safety Initiative launched by IATA, CANSO and ACI.

27.3 The initiative seeks to identify emerging runway hazards through Local Runway Safety Teams before they contribute to serious occurrences.

Mark Searle, IATA Director of Safety +1

28. **Day Three – 8 October 2026**

Session 7: One Industry, One Data Vision – Advancing Safety Through Collaboration

Time: 09:00–10:20

28.1 This was one of the most technically significant Safety sessions, consisting of three complementary presentations.

28.2 **A. Collaborative safety data and GADM**

The first discussion examined how IATA's Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) programme can convert information shared by airlines into actionable safety intelligence.

Participants included:

- Chantal Berthiaume – IATA (Moderator)
- Capt. Paul Martin – Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
- Zora Ho – Cathay Pacific
- Edward Jumi – IATA

28.3 The programme explored how airlines, regulators and IATA can use shared information to improve risk-based decisions. The broader significance is that individual airlines may have insufficient data to identify relatively rare but potentially catastrophic events. Industry-wide data sharing can help reveal patterns that would otherwise remain undetected.

28.4 **B. Joint IATA–Boeing study on go-around decision-making**

A particularly important presentation was devoted to a joint IATA–Boeing study examining go-around decisions and execution.

Presenters: Craig Bomben of Boeing and Edward Jumi of IATA.

28.5 The study examined:

- Global trends in go-around events.
- Characteristics of different go-around scenarios.
- Decision-making and execution practices.
- Human and operational factors.
- Bowtie risk models for major go-around hazards.
- Management of safe outcomes.

28.6 This subject is directly relevant to approach-and-landing accident prevention. A go-around is an essential safety manoeuvre, but the decision to initiate one must be timely, and its execution requires appropriate crew coordination and aircraft handling. A useful application for airlines would be to review whether recurrent simulator programmes adequately assess both the decision to discontinue an approach and the safe execution of the subsequent manoeuvre.

28.7 **C. Using ADS-B and incident data to identify GNSS interference**

The final presentation, by IATA data scientist Pooya Khoshabi, examined how ADS-B information and incident data can be combined to identify GNSS jamming and spoofing events. This represents an important development in data-driven safety monitoring. IATA's opening address reported that, compared with 2023, reported GNSS jamming increased by 67% in 2025, while GPS spoofing incidents increased by 193%.

28.8 These developments reinforce the need for navigation-system resilience, appropriate crew training and effective operational reporting.

Mark Searle, IATA Director of Safety +1

29. **Session 8: Safety Leadership – People Behind Performance**

Time: 11:10–12:30

Participants

Name	Organisation
• Dr Steven Shorrock – Introductory presentation	EUROCONTROL
• Mariam Khojayan – Moderator	IATA

• Dr Caroline Pike	International Atomic Energy Agency
• İsmail Ustaoğlu	Turkish Airlines
• Dr Steven Shorrock	EUROCONTROL

29.1 The concluding Safety session examined how leadership influences the behaviour, confidence and effectiveness of aviation professionals. A notable feature was the participation of a safety specialist from the nuclear industry, providing an opportunity for cross-industry learning.

29.2 The discussion programme focused on how organisations can preserve collective safety capability and sustain it over time. Three important considerations arise from this subject.

a) **Leadership** must create the conditions for safe performance. Personnel need adequate resources, training, professional support and the confidence to raise safety concerns.
b) **Safety culture** must be demonstrated through management decisions. A written safety policy has limited value if commercial or organisational pressures consistently take precedence over operational concerns.
c) **Institutional knowledge** must be preserved. Experienced safety professionals should be encouraged to transfer their knowledge through structured mentoring and succession planning.

29.3 **For FIP**, the session reinforces the value of involving experienced pilots and technical specialists in **Aviation Safety governance**.

PART IV – CRISIS MANAGEMENT TRACK





30. The Crisis Management track went beyond traditional aircraft accident emergency planning. Its central proposition was that an airline's response capability should not exist merely as a documented Emergency Response Plan (ERP). It must function as an integrated organisational system capable of protecting people, maintaining essential operations and supporting recovery during a major crisis.

30.1 **Day One – 06 October 2026**

Session 1: Reframing Emergency Response Planning Around Human Needs

Time: 14:00–15:20

Participants

- Waleska Fortini – LATAM (Moderator)
- Theresa DiVeronica – Delta Air Lines
- Abigail Pollard – Blake Emergency Services
- Richard Gomez – MedAire

30.2 This session examined how emergency response planning should evolve from a documentation-focused activity into a capability centred on human needs. The programme identified three principal areas.

A. Leadership and Psychological Safety during Emergencies

A major crisis places considerable pressure on decision-makers and responders. Effective crisis leadership requires clear responsibilities, timely decisions and an organisational environment in which personnel can raise concerns without hesitation.

B. Assistance to Passengers and Families

An emergency response programme must address the needs of people directly affected by an occurrence. These include passengers, relatives, employees and emergency responders. Family assistance should therefore be integrated into the emergency response structure rather than treated as a secondary administrative function.

C. Organisational Resilience through People

Even a comprehensive emergency manual cannot anticipate every possible situation. The effectiveness of an emergency response depends heavily on trained personnel capable of adapting procedures to rapidly changing circumstances.

30.3 Suggested application for India: Airlines should periodically assess whether their emergency response arrangements provide adequate family assistance, communication, personnel support and coordination with relevant authorities.

31. Session 2: Emergency Response Is Not a Plan, It's a System – Embedding Crisis Management into SMS

Time: 16:10–17:30

31.1 This was one of the most important regulatory and organisational discussions in the Crisis Management track.

Participants

Name	Organisation
• Gill Sparrow – Moderator	Emirates
• Isabel Ferreira	IATA, IOSA Lead Auditor
• Eduard Ciofu	EASA
• Richard Allen-Williams	British Airways

31.2 The programme identified a fundamental weakness in conventional Emergency Response Planning: many Organisations maintain an ERP primarily as a compliance document, separate from everyday safety risk management. The session examined how emergency preparedness should become an integral component of the Safety Management System (SMS).

31.3 **Principal discussion areas**

a) **Integration with Safety Risk Management**
b) **Potential emergency scenarios** should be considered during routine risk assessments rather than only after an occurrence.
c) **Integration with Safety Assurance**
d) **Emergency exercises** should provide measurable information about the effectiveness of an organisation's response capability.
e) **Continuous learning**
f) **Lessons** identified during emergency exercises and actual occurrences should lead to improvements in training, procedures and organisational preparedness.
g) **IOSA developments**

31.4 The session specifically examined changes to emergency-response-related IOSA Standards and Recommended Practices (ISARPs) being introduced through IOSA

Standards Manual Edition 19 (ISM19). The important implication is that emergency preparedness should be assessed through practical organisational capability, not merely the existence of a documented plan.

32. **Day Two – 07 October 2026**

Session 3: Integrating Mental Health, Peer Support and Duty of Care into ERP

Time: 09:00–10:20

Participants

- Bill Nicklay – American Airlines (Moderator)
- Bruce Wong – Hong Kong Volunteer Rescue Association
- Joyce Leung – Cathay Pacific
- Rachel Warner – American Airlines

32.1 This session addressed a dimension of emergency response that can be overlooked: the psychological wellbeing of people involved in or affected by aviation emergencies. The programme considered how emergency response plans can be linked to existing peer-support, critical-incident response and mental-health programmes.

32.2 **Areas of Particular Importance**

a) Support for affected aviation personnel
b) Pilots, Cabin Crew, Ground Staff and Emergency Responders may require structured assistance following traumatic occurrences.
c) Peer-support programmes
d) Appropriately **Trained Peers** can provide an additional source of support, alongside qualified professional services.
e) Duty of care
f) An airline's responsibility does not end when the immediate operational emergency has been resolved.
g) Support may need to continue throughout the recovery period.
h) Coordination of existing programmes

32.3 Rather than maintaining isolated support arrangements, airlines should examine how emergency response, employee assistance and peer-support systems can operate together.

32.4 Airlines should establish arrangements for timely access to appropriately qualified mental health professionals following traumatic operational events.

32.5 **FIP Recommends That**:

- Psychological support be separated, as far as practicable, from punitive disciplinary processes.
- Confidentiality be protected, subject to applicable safety and legal obligations.

- Peer-support personnel receive appropriate training.
- Crew members receive suitable assistance before returning to safety-critical duties.
- Long-term support be available where necessary.

32.5 **For FIP, this subject provides a strong basis for advocating confidential, professionally supported post-incident assistance for pilots and other aviation personnel. Starting Ashwasan!!!! Peer to Peer program.**

33. **Session 4: Integrated Crisis Management – The Organisational Resilience Imperative**

Time: 11:10–12:30

Participants

Name	Organisation
• Colin Arnott – Moderator	Formerly Qantas Group
• Abdelaziz Alsuwaidi	Sharjah Airport
• Kerim Yurduseven	Wizz Air UK
• Jasmin Desai	Lufthansa Group

33.1 This session examined how airlines should respond to increasingly complex and interconnected threats. The programme specifically identified cyber threats, advanced AI-related risks, geopolitical instability, supply-chain vulnerabilities and extreme weather events.

33.2 **Three Capabilities Requiring Integration**

a) Business Continuity Planning (BCP)
b) Maintaining essential business and operational functions during disruption.
c) Emergency Response Planning (ERP)
d) Responding to emergencies and protecting affected people.
e) Crisis Management
f) Providing strategic leadership, coordination and decision-making during high-consequence events.

The central question was how these capabilities can function as a unified system rather than separate organisational departments.

33.3 **Operational Implications**

A serious cyber incident, for example, may simultaneously affect flight planning, crew rostering, passenger information and operational communications. An effective

response therefore requires coordinated leadership and contingency arrangements across multiple departments.

33.4 **For Indian Airlines, this suggests the value of conducting integrated crisis exercises involving Flight Operations, information technology, security, Airport Operations, Communications and Senior Management.**

34. **Session 5: Future Horizons – Technology, New Developments and the Human Role in ERP**

Time: 14:00–15:20

Participants

- Tuğse Su Yalçintürk – Turkish Airlines (Moderator)
- Ozgur Pire – Turkish Airlines
- Sheron Fernando – Etihad Airways
- Elmarie Marais – Go Crisis

34.1 This session examined how emerging technologies are transforming emergency response planning. The published programme specifically identified artificial intelligence decision-support tools, digital twins and new communication platforms.

A. Artificial Intelligence in Crisis Management

AI-based systems offer opportunities to support the organisation and interpretation of large volumes of information during an emergency. However, automated outputs must be evaluated carefully, particularly when information is incomplete or rapidly changing.

B. Digital Twins

Digital representations of operational systems may support emergency simulations, preparedness exercises and the examination of alternative response scenarios.

C. Communication Technology

New communication platforms can improve coordination between emergency teams, airline departments and external stakeholders.

D. Preserving Human Judgement

The programme explicitly emphasised the continuing importance of leadership, ethical decision-making and human judgement as technology advances. The key consideration is that technology should support crisis decision-makers rather than create inappropriate dependence on automated recommendations.

35. **Session 6: Learning From Crisis – Turning Events and Exercises into Organisational Change**

Time: 16:10–17:30

Participants

Name	Organisation
• Alexandra Lyons – Moderator	British Airways
• Faye Jones	Kenyon International
• Jorge Rodrigues Solsona	Vueling
• Tim Rolfe	Heli Offshore

35.1 This was an especially practical session because it addressed the difference between identifying lessons and actually implementing improvements. The programme examined structured after-action reviews, lessons capture, integration into SMS and training, and performance monitoring.

35.2 **Important Operational Considerations**

An airline may conduct an **emergency exercise** and identify deficiencies, but the exercise has limited long-term value unless those deficiencies are corrected. An **effective review** process should establish what occurred, what worked, what failed and what **corrective actions** are required. Each action should have a responsible person, an **implementation deadline** and a means of verifying effectiveness.

35.3 The programme also examined reporting **Emergency-response Performance** to organisational governance forums. This is important because **Senior Management** must remain accountable for ensuring that identified weaknesses are addressed.

35.4 **Recommended FIP application**: Aviation Organisations should maintain documented corrective-action systems following **Emergency Exercises, with periodic reviews of outstanding Safety-critical findings.**

36. **Day Three – 08 October 2026**

Session 7: Emergency Response Planning in Airline Partnership Arrangements

Time: 09:00–10:20

Participants

- Colin Arnott – Moderator
- Gill Sparrow – Emirates
- Nicky Folwell – Titan Airways

36.1 This session presented outcomes from the Partnerships Work stream of IATA's Emergency Response Planning Task Force. Its principal recommendation was that emergency response planning should be incorporated into airline partnership arrangements from their inception, rather than addressed only after contractual agreements have been concluded.

36.2 **Why this matters**

Modern airlines frequently operate through codes

37. IMPORTANT COMMON LESSONS FOR OPERATIONS AND CABIN OPERATIONS

37.1 The **Operations and Cabin Operations** discussions at IATA WSOC 2026 highlighted the increasing complexity of modern Airline Operations and the need to equip Aviation Professionals with the competencies, information and organisational support necessary to manage that complexity.

37.2 For **Pilots**, the emphasis was on future training frameworks, operational resilience, digital transformation and informed decision-making.

37.3 For **Cabin Crew**, the focus extended to passenger behaviour, effective safety communication, medical emergencies, lithium battery hazards and the support required to perform safety-critical duties.

37.4 For FIP, the most significant policy implication is that **Aviation Safety improvement must be approached as an integrated system**. Investment in **technology and regulatory** compliance must be accompanied by equally strong investment in professional training, human performance, operational experience and effective coordination **between Cockpit and Cabin personnel**.

37.5 One particularly useful feature of WSOC 2026 was that its **Operations and Cabin Operations tracks** were organised around a **common Human-Performan**ce theme. This allows several important connections to be drawn.

Operations issue	**Corresponding Cabin Operations issue**
Pilot Competency-based Training	Cabin Crew Competency Development
Operational Workforce resilience	Cabin Crew Performance and Fatigue
Digital Operational Information	Data-driven inflight medical response
Airspace Disruption	Cabin preparedness for diversions and emergencies
Operational Risk Management	Lithium battery and Passenger safety risks
Flight Crew Decision-making	Effective Cabin-to-cockpit communication
International Regulatory Harmonisation	Harmonised Cabin Safety standards

The broader lesson is that flight safety cannot be divided into isolated departmental responsibilities.

37.6 Pilots, Cabin Crew, Dispatchers, Engineers, Air Traffic Controllers and Airline Management form an interconnected operational safety system. The Federation of

Indian Pilots (FIP) considers **Flight Operations and Cabin Safety** to be **two inseparable pillars of Aviation Safety**. Safe airline operations require much more than regulatory compliance; they demand effective coordination between Flight Crew, Cabin Crew, Dispatchers, Ground Personnel, Airline Management and Regulatory Authorities.

37.7 The discussions associated with the IATA World Safety & Operations Conference 2026 provide an important opportunity to reassess existing operational practices in light of increasing air traffic, technological advancement, human-performance limitations and emerging safety challenges. FIP believes that as India's Aviation Sector continues to expand, **Operational Safety standards, Professional Training, Crew Competency and Regulatory Oversight** must develop at a pace commensurate with industry growth. FIP's central position is that commercial efficiency, operational punctuality and cost optimisation must never compromise Flight Safety, Crew preparedness or the authority of the Pilot-in-Command.

38. PRINCIPAL AREAS COVERED UNDER OPERATIONS & CABIN SAFETY

The WSOC 2026 programme included **dedicated tracks for Operations and Cabin Operations** under the overarching theme Performance Through People: Driving Safety, Operational Agility, and Crisis Response. The conference agenda addressed operational resilience, airspace management, human performance, turbulence, passenger safety, inflight medical response and emerging cabin risks.

38.1 FIP identifies the following areas as particularly relevant to the **Indian Aviation Industry.**

OPERATIONS	CABIN SAFETY
• Operational Risk and Human Performance	Cabin Crew Safety competency
• Flight Crew Fatigue Management	Turbulence-related injuries
• Airspace efficiency and Geopolitical Risks	Lithium Battery Fire hazards
• Flight ispatch and operational control	Unruly Passenger Management
• Fuel Planning and Operational efficiency	Inflight Medical Emergencies
• Flight data monitoring and predictive safety	Passenger safety awareness
• Automation and pilot decision-making	Crew coordination and emergency procedures
• Operational Resilience during Disruptions	Cabin Crew Fatigue and Well being

Flight Safety must take precedence over Commercial and Operational pressures

38.2 **FIP** states that **Airline Operational policies must clearly establish that Safety** takes precedence over schedule adherence, Aircraft Utilisation, Fuel Efficiency and Commercial considerations. Pilots must retain the authority to delay, divert, discontinue an approach or reject an operational assignment whenever safety conditions warrant such action. No flight crew member should face adverse consequences for a professionally justified safety decision.

38.3 **Human Performance Remains the Foundation of Safe Flight Operations**

The increasing introduction of automation, artificial intelligence and digital operational systems must not result in the erosion of fundamental piloting skills. FIP believes that manual flying proficiency, situational awareness, critical thinking and effective Crew Resource Management (CRM) remain essential. Overdependence on automation may introduce vulnerabilities when aircraft encounter abnormal or unforeseen situations.

38.4 **Fatigue Management Requires Stronger Regulatory Attention**

Fatigue continues to represent a significant operational hazard, particularly during night operations, multiple-sector duties, irregular rosters and operations involving circadian disruption. FIP concludes that compliance with prescribed Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) alone does not necessarily establish that a crew member is adequately rested. Scientific fatigue-risk assessment must supplement regulatory duty limitations.

38.5 **Operational Resilience Requires Improved Coordination**

Increasing airspace congestion, geopolitical instability, adverse weather, airport infrastructure constraints and air traffic restrictions require **closer coordination among Pilots, Dispatchers, ATC and Airline Operations Control Centres**. FIP supports the development of **integrated Operational decision-making systems** that provide crews with accurate and timely information.

38.6 **Safety Data must be Translated into Preventive Action**

Flight Data Monitoring, incident reporting and operational trend analysis should be used to identify risks before they result in serious occurrences. FIP considers that collecting Safety Data without implementing measurable corrective action defeats the purpose of an effective Safety Management System.

39. **FIP RECOMMENDATIONS ON FLIGHT OPERATIONS**

Recommendation 1: Strengthen Fatigue Risk Management Systems

39.1 FIP recommends that DGCA adopt a more comprehensive and scientifically supported approach to Fatigue Management, drawing upon ICAO and EASA principles. Particular attention should be given to:

- Consecutive night duties and operations during the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL).

- Adequate recovery following long and disruptive duty periods.
- Cumulative fatigue resulting from repeated early starts and late finishes.
- Multiple-sector operations.
- Appropriate limitations on extended Flight Duty Periods.
- Independent evaluation of airline FRMS performance.

Airline Fatigue-Reporting mechanisms must protect pilots against retaliation and ensure that reported concerns are investigated objectively.

39.2 **Recommendation 2: Protect Pilot-in-Command Authority**

FIP RECOMMENDS explicit Regulatory reinforcement of the Pilot-in-Command's final authority concerning the safe conduct of flights.

39.3 Airline Management and operations control centres must not exert direct or indirect commercial pressure on pilots concerning fuel requirements, weather-related diversions, flight continuation or operational acceptance.

39.4 **Recommendation 3: Strengthen Evidence-Based Training and Competency Assessment**

FIP recommends that airlines progressively strengthen Evidence-Based Training (EBT) and competency-based assessment. Training should place greater emphasis on:

a) Manual Flying and Aircraft Handling.

b) Recognition and Management of Automation Failures.

c) Unreliable Airspeed and Flight-control Abnormalities.

d) Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT).

e) Decision-making under Operational Stress.

f) CRM and Communication.

g) Handling Multiple Simultaneous System Failures.

39.5 Simulator training should incorporate realistic operational scenarios rather than relying excessively on predictable, repetitive exercises.

39.6 **Recommendation 4: Improve Operational Risk Assessment for Conflict Zones**

Airlines should implement dynamic Airspace-Risk Assessments incorporating geopolitical developments, Conflict-zone Advisories, GNSS Interference and Communication disruptions. Flight Crews must receive timely information and suitable alternative routing options. Commercially advantageous routes should not be selected when unacceptable safety risks have been identified.

39.7 **Recommendation 5: Strengthen Fuel Planning and Operational Decision-Making**

FIP supports initiatives aimed at improving fuel efficiency and reducing environmental impact. However, fuel conservation must never compromise regulatory fuel reserves or operational safety margins. Pilots should retain appropriate discretion to request additional fuel based on weather, congestion, airport conditions and anticipated operational uncertainty.

39.8 **Recommendation 6: Establish a National Flight Operations Safety Forum**

FIP RECOMMENDS that DGCA establish a periodic forum involving airline operators, Flight Crew representatives, ATC, Airport Operators and Aviation Safety specialists. The forum should examine emerging Operational Hazards, Safety Trends, Fatigue Concerns and Regulatory Developments.

FIP SHOULD BE REPRESENTED IN THIS MECHANISM.

40. **TRACK – II: CABIN SAFETY**

40.1 FIP considers Cabin Safety to be an integral part of Aircraft Operational Safety rather than a function secondary to Passenger service. The conference's Cabin Operations agenda highlighted several significant subjects, including Lithium Battery Safety, Passenger behaviour, Inflight Medical Response and more effective Passenger Safety Communication.

40.2 **Cabin Crew Are Safety Professionals First**

FIP is firm that the primary responsibility of cabin crew is to ensure passenger safety, manage emergencies and support the safe operation of the aircraft. Commercial service expectations must never interfere with safety-related duties.

40.3 **Turbulence-related Injuries Require Greater Preventive Attention**

Turbulence remains a major operational concern for cabin crew and passengers.

40.4 FIP believes that the increasing availability of turbulence-prediction and information-sharing systems should be translated into more effective preventive procedures. Cabin Crew must receive sufficient advance warning to discontinue service and secure themselves whenever practicable.

40.5 **Lithium Battery Incidents Constitute an Emerging Cabin Safety Challenge**

The increasing carriage of portable electronic devices, power banks and lithium-ion batteries creates additional fire and thermal-runaway risks. That existing Training and Emergency procedures require continuous review to address these hazards.

40.6 **Unruly Passengers Pose a Direct Threat to Flight Safety**

Disruptive and Aggressive Passenger Behaviour can Compromise Cabin Crew effectiveness, distract Flight Crew and necessitate flight diversions. FIP believes that prevention must begin before boarding, supported by coordinated action involving airport operators, security agencies and airlines.

40.7 **Flight deck and cabin communication is essential**

A lack of timely communication between pilots and cabin crew during abnormal situations can significantly affect emergency management. FIP emphasises the need for clearly defined communication protocols, common situational awareness and joint emergency training.

40.8 **Cabin Crew Fatigue requires Formal Recognition**

Cabin Crew experience many of the same fatigue-inducing operational conditions as pilots. FIP concludes that Cabin Crew fatigue must be treated as an operational safety hazard and incorporated into airline Fatigue-Risk Management Policies.

41. **FIP RECOMMENDATIONS CABIN SAFETY**

41.1 **Recommendation 1: Establish Enhanced Cabin Safety Training Standards**


41.2 FIP recommends that DGCA review Cabin Crew training requirements in consultation with airlines, experienced Cabin Crew, Pilot representatives and Aviation Training Institutions.

41.3 Training should include:

- Emergency evacuation and Passenger Management.
- Aircraft Fire and Smoke Management.
- Lithium Battery Thermal-runaway Incidents.
- Turbulence-related Injury Prevention.
- Inflight Medical Emergencies.
- Unruly Passenger Management.
- CRM and Human Factors.
- Flight Deck–Cabin Coordination.
- Emergency Communication and Decision-Making.

Training should be competency-based and supported by practical simulation.

41.4 **Recommendation 2: Strengthen Turbulence Management Procedures**



41.5 FIP RECOMMENDS greater adoption of turbulence-information sharing, including initiatives such as IATA Turbulence Aware. Airlines should establish clear procedures for early suspension of Cabin Service, securing equipment and ensuring Cabin Crew are seated and restrained whenever conditions require. Specific recommendations include:

a) Improved turbulence forecasting and Cockpit Alerts.

b) Timely Communication from pilots to Cabin Crew.

c) Clear criteria for suspending Cabin Service.

d) Enhanced Passenger seatbelt awareness.

e) Analysis of Turbulence-related injuries and Operational Reports.

Cabin crew must have the authority to discontinue service whenever continued movement in the cabin presents an unacceptable safety risk.

41.6 **Recommendation 3: Introduce Standardised Lithium Battery Fire Response Training**



41.7 **FIP RECOMMENDS**

a) That DGCA and airlines periodically review procedures for the carriage and management of lithium battery-powered devices.

b) Cabin Crew must receive practical training in recognising battery overheating, smoke generation, fire and thermal runaway.

c) Airlines should provide appropriate fire-containment and cooling equipment consistent with aircraft-specific procedures and applicable regulatory guidance.

d) Passenger awareness should be strengthened regarding power banks, spare batteries and damaged electronic devices.

41.8 **Recommendation 4: Develop a Coordinated Policy for Unruly Passengers**

FIP recommends the establishment of a standardised national framework for Managing Disruptive Passengers. This should include:

a) Early identification of disruptive behaviour before boarding.

b) Improved coordination between airport security and airline personnel.

c) De-escalation training for Cabin Crew.

d) Clearly defined Escalation Procedures.

e) Effective legal and Administrative Action against Serious Offenders.

f) Support for Crew members subjected to Physical or Verbal Abuse.

41.9 **The Pilot-in-Command must retain the Authority to refuse carriage or divert the aircraft where necessary for safety.**

41.10 **Recommendation 5: Strengthen Inflight Medical Emergency Preparedness**

41.11 **FIP recommends**

a) That Cabin Crew receive periodic practical training in medical emergency management, including CPR, AED operation and the recognition of life-threatening medical conditions.

b) Airlines should review the availability of suitable medical equipment and ground-based medical advisory support.

c) Standardised communication procedures should be established between cabin crew, flight crew and medical advisory services to support timely decisions regarding diversions.

49.2**5 Recommendation 6: Introduce Joint Flight Crew–Cabin Crew Emergency Training**

41.12 **FIP strongly recommends that airlines conduct periodic Joint Emergency-Response Exercises involving both flight crew and cabin crew. Training should cover:**

Emergency scenario	Training objective
• Rejected take-off	Cabin assessment and crew communication
• Rapid decompression	Oxygen deployment and cabin coordination
• Smoke or fire	Immediate reporting and coordinated response
• Emergency descent	Cabin preparation and passenger protection
• Emergency landing	Passenger briefing and evacuation readiness
• Ditching	Coordinated survival and evacuation procedures
• Unruly passenger	Threat assessment and cockpit protection
• Inflight medical emergency	Communication and diversion coordination

Such Training should reinforce the principle that the flight deck and Cabin operate as one integrated safety team.

41.13 **Recommendation 7: Review Cabin Crew Fatigue and Rostering Practices**

41.14 **FIP RECOMMENDS**

a) That DGCA review the adequacy of existing Cabin Crew duty and rest provisions and consider Fatigue-Risk Management Principles appropriate to Cabin Operations.

b) Airlines should ensure adequate recovery periods, suitable rest facilities and confidential fatigue-reporting mechanisms.

41.15 **Recommendation 8: Improve Passenger Safety Awareness**

Passenger Safety briefings should be redesigned to improve comprehension, retention and compliance. Particular attention should be given to:

a) Seatbelt usage during unexpected turbulence.

b) Correct handling of Electronic Devices and Batteries.

c) Emergency Exit Procedures.

d) Evacuation without Personal Baggage.

e) Compliance with Cabin Crew Safety Instructions.

Safety information should be accessible to passengers with different linguistic, physical and cognitive needs.

42. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIP AND INDIAN CIVIL AVIATION

Based on the conference programme, the following five areas deserve priority consideration.

a. **Competency-based Pilot and Cabin Crew Training**: India should examine how competency-based training can strengthen operational judgement, communication and emergency preparedness without diluting essential training and experience requirements.

b. **Integrated Fatigue Risk Management:** Airlines should assess human-performance risks across both cockpit and cabin operations, particularly during extended duties, night operations and irregular schedules.

c. **Greater emphasis on Cabin Safety**: Cabin crew should be recognised as safety-critical aviation professionals, with adequate recurrent training, regulatory oversight and organisational support.

d. **Operational Resilience**: Indian airlines should strengthen preparedness for geopolitical airspace disruptions, digital-system changes and emerging operational risks.

e. **Joint Cockpit-Cabin Emergency Training**: Airlines should consider integrated training scenarios involving medical emergencies, battery fires, unruly passengers, diversions and emergency evacuations.

43. FIP VIEWS ON AVIATION SAFETY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

43.1 FIP's Overall Assessment

The **Federation of Indian Pilots (FIP)** considers **Aviation Safety and Crisis Management to be inseparable** components of a robust aviation ecosystem. The discussions surrounding the IATA World Safety & Operations Conference 2026 provide an important opportunity to examine how **Airlines, Regulators, Pilots, Aircraft Manufacturers, Airport Operators and Accident Investigation Authorities** can collectively strengthen global aviation safety.

43.2 FIP believes that the **Aviation industry must progressively transition from a reactive safety-management approach, primarily dependent on learning from accidents and serious incidents, to a proactive and predictive safety culture capable of identifying emerging risks before they culminate in catastrophic events**. In particular, the Federation emphasises that flight crew must be recognised not merely as operational personnel but as essential stakeholders in safety-policy formulation, risk assessment, accident prevention, emergency preparedness and post-accident investigations. The following conclusions and recommendations represent FIP's proposed institutional position, informed by the conference themes and wider international **Aviation Safety** principles. They should not be interpreted as resolutions formally adopted by IATA.

44. KEY CONCLUSIONS DRAWN ON AVIATION SAFETY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY FIP

The conference, organised under the theme Performance Through People, highlighted the need to integrate human expertise, technology and global safety standards. IATA specifically identified these three elements as essential to achieving further improvements in Aviation Safety.

44.1 Based on the conference's Safety and Crisis Management tracks, FIP draws the following conclusions.

44.1.1 Human performance must remain central to Aviation Safety

Despite advancements in artificial intelligence, automation and predictive technologies, the ultimate responsibility for critical operational decisions continues to rest with trained aviation professionals. FIP concludes that **technology must complement, rather than diminish**, the professional judgement, situational awareness and decision-making authority of pilots.

44.1.2 Crisis management must become an integral part of Safety Management Systems (SMS)

44.1.3 **Emergency Response Planning (ERP)** should no longer be treated merely as a regulatory compliance exercise. **Airlines must develop an integrated approach** connecting SMS, emergency response, business continuity, operational recovery and post-accident assistance. Accident prevention must receive greater emphasis The aviation industry must strengthen its ability to identify hazards through:

- Flight Data Monitoring (FDM).
- Voluntary and confidential safety reporting.
- Analysis of incidents and operational deviations.
- Predictive risk modelling.
- Continuous assessment of human factors and organisational risks.

44.1.4 Accident investigations must be independent, transparent and technically credible

FIP believes that the effectiveness of Aviation Safety depends significantly on the credibility of Accident Investigations. Investigations should be conducted independently, without commercial, administrative or institutional influence, in accordance with ICAO Annex 13. The objective must remain accident prevention rather than apportionment of blame or liability.

44.1.5 Emergency response must prioritise human needs

The conference specifically highlighted the importance of reframing emergency response planning around human needs and integrating mental health, peer support and duty of care into crisis management. **FIP concludes that airlines must accord equal importance to passenger survival, family assistance, crew welfare, psychological recovery and transparent communication.**

44.1.6 **Geopolitical instability represents an increasing aviation safety risk**

Airspace restrictions, conflict zones, GNSS interference, cybersecurity threats and rapidly changing geopolitical situations require continuous risk assessment.

COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS MUST NEVER OVERRIDE FLIGHT SAFETY.

45. **FIP'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO MOCA, DGCA AND AIRLINE OPERATORS**

45.1 **Recommendation 1: Establish an integrated National Aviation Safety Framework**

FIP recommends that the Ministry of Civil Aviation and DGCA develop a strengthened National Aviation Safety Framework aligned with ICAO standards. The framework should incorporate:

- A comprehensive State Safety Programme (SSP).
- Mandatory SMS implementation and effective Oversight.
- Integration of Airline Safety data and Operational Risk indicators.
- Periodic assessment of emerging Operational Hazards.
- Structured participation of Pilots and Professional Aviation Organisations.

FIP SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A RECOGNISED STAKEHOLDER IN CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO AVIATION SAFETY AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

45.2 **Recommendation 2: Strengthen the Independence and Technical capability of AAIB**

FIP recommends that the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) be strengthened in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 and Doc 9756. The AAIB must have sufficient number of investigators who are highly qualified and meet all the requirements spelt out in ICAO Doc 9756. There is a need to totally reorganise the AAIB with adequate number of investigators.

45.3 Particular emphasis should be placed on:

a) Functional and operational independence.
b) Adequate numbers of professionally qualified accident investigators.
c) Access to experienced pilots, aircraft systems specialists and human-factors experts.
d) Independent verification of critical technical findings, including simulator-based evaluations.
e) Transparent consideration of technically substantiated stakeholder submissions.
f) Timely publication of investigation findings and safety recommendations.

45.4 Where **simulator reconstruction is used to establish an accident sequence**, the underlying assumptions, aircraft configuration, environmental conditions and timing methodology should be independently validated. FIP further recommends that technically competent Pilot Organisations be permitted to submit expert observations for consideration by the investigation authority, without compromising investigative independence or confidentiality.

45.5 **Recommendation 3: Introduce Mandatory Crisis-Management Simulation Exercises**

FIP recommends that Airlines conduct comprehensive crisis-management exercises at least annually, supplemented by periodic table top exercises.

45.6 These should include scenarios involving:

Crisis scenario	Essential response capability
Major aircraft accident	Rescue coordination and Family Assistance
Emergency landing	Flight crew, Cabin Crew and Airport Coordination
Cyberattack	Operational continuity and communication
Conflict-zone disruption	Diversion and Airspace Risk Management
Aircraft disappearance	Search and Rescue Coordination
Mass-casualty incident	Medical Response and Victim Identification
Airport shutdown	Passenger Welfare and Recovery Planning

Exercises should involve Airlines, Airport Operators, ATC, Emergency Services, Hospitals, Regulators and relevant government agencies. Their effectiveness should be independently evaluated, with corrective actions monitored until closure.

45.7 **Recommendation 4: Introduce a Structured Flight Crew Mental Health and Peer Support Programme**

FIP Recommends

a) That the development of **Confidential, Professionally Administered Mental-health and Peer-support Programmes for Pilots**.
b) These should include psychological support following serious incidents, accidents, **Security threats and traumatic Operational** experiences.
c) Crew members involved in major emergencies should receive **appropriate medical and psychological evaluation** before returning to operational duties.
d) Such **programmes must be non-punitive**, subject to applicable safety and medical reporting requirements, and designed to encourage early assistance.

45.8 **Recommendation 5: Improve Fatigue-Risk Management and Human-Performance monitoring**

FIP considers fatigue a critical operational hazard that must be addressed through scientific and evidence-based regulatory oversight. DGCA should strengthen Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS), particularly concerning:

- Consecutive Night Duties.
- Operations during the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL).
- Cumulative Fatigue and inadequate recovery periods.
- Multiple-sector Operations.
- Rostering practices and actual Sleep Opportunities.
- Commercial pressure influencing Flight Crew decisions.

Fatigue reporting should be confidential and protected from retaliation.

45.9 Recommendation 6: Establish a National Aviation Crisis Coordination Mechanism

FIP recommends the establishment of a coordinated national aviation crisis-response mechanism under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, with clearly defined responsibilities for participating organisations. Its principal functions should include:

- Coordinating information between Airlines, Airports and Government Agencies.
- Facilitating immediate Search-and-Rescue Mobilisation.
- Establishing a centralised Passenger and Family Information mechanism.
- Coordinating International Assistance when required.
- Supporting timely and Accurate Public Communication.
- Conducting post-crisis Reviews and Monitoring Corrective actions.

The mechanism should facilitate coordination without interfering with AAIB's independent investigation responsibilities.

45.10 Recommendation 7: Strengthen crisis communication and family assistance

FIP recommends that airlines adopt comprehensive family-assistance and crisis-communication policies consistent with ICAO guidance and IATA best practices. Families of passengers and crew must receive timely, accurate and compassionate assistance.

45.10.1 Airlines should establish dedicated family-assistance teams and ensure that information concerning casualties, survivors and missing persons is verified before public disclosure.

45.10.2 Media communication should be handled by trained spokespersons to minimise speculation and the circulation of unverified information.

45.11 Recommendation 8: Promote responsible use of Artificial Intelligence in Aviation Safety

FIP supports the use of **AI** for **predictive Safety Analysis**, **Operational Risk Assessment, Maintenance Monitoring and Emergency-Response Coordination**. However, the following safeguards are essential:

- Human Oversight of Safety-critical decisions.
- Validation of AI-generated Operational Recommendations.
- Protection of Confidential Crew and Operational data.
- Clear accountability for technology-assisted decisions.
- Continuous monitoring for inaccurate or misleading outputs.

AI should function as a decision-support mechanism and not as an unverified substitute for professional aviation judgement.

46. **Proposed Role of FIP and Its Educational Wing, IAAS**

FIP believes that the knowledge and experience gained from international safety conferences must be translated into practical training and measurable operational improvements. Through its educational wing, IAAS, FIP proposes to contribute to aviation safety by undertaking the following initiatives:

A. **Flight Operations Safety Programmes**

Development of specialised courses covering flight operations risk management, Human Factors, Accident Prevention, Operational Decision-making and Aviation safety investigation.

B. **Cabin Safety Training**

Introduction of focused training modules covering emergency preparedness, cabin fire Management, Lithium Battery Incidents, Turbulence Management and Passenger Safety.

C. **Specialised Safety Training**

Development and delivery of professional training programmes covering aviation accident prevention, incident investigation, safety management, human factors and operational risk assessment.

D. **Crisis-Management Training**

Introduction of structured programmes for pilots, cabin crew, flight dispatchers, airline safety managers and emergency-response personnel.

E. **Joint Safety Workshops**

Conducting periodic workshops involving experienced pilots, investigators, regulators and airline safety specialists to examine emerging aviation hazards and lessons from major incidents.

F. **Joint CRM Workshops**

Conducting integrated training programmes involving Pilots, Cabin Crew and Flight Dispatchers to strengthen Coordination during normal, abnormal and emergency operations.

G**. Technical Representation**

Submission of evidence-based recommendations to MoCA, DGCA, AAIB and other competent authorities on matters affecting aviation safety.

H. **Aviation Safety Research**

Undertaking studies concerning fatigue, Operational Risk, Crew Performance and Emerging Safety Hazards affecting Indian civil aviation.

I**. International Collaboration**

Exploring opportunities for collaboration with IATA and other recognised aviation institutions to strengthen professional competency and safety awareness in the Indian aviation sector.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF FIP

47. **Concluding Statement for FIP**

FIP proposes the following statement for inclusion in its official conference assessment or representation to the Ministry of Civil Aviation:

47.1 **FIP – Concluding Statement on Aviation Safety and Crisis Management**

The Federation of Indian Pilots welcomes the emphasis placed by the IATA World Safety & Operations Conference 2026, Istanbul, on strengthening aviation safety through **Human Performance, Technological Advancement, International Cooperation and Effective Crisis Management**.

47.2 FIP firmly believes that the next significant advancement in aviation safety will not emerge from technology alone, but from empowering Aviation Professionals, strengthening institutional accountability, ensuring independent Accident Investigations and developing a proactive Safety Culture across the Aviation Ecosystem.

47.3 India, being one of the world's major and expanding Aviation Markets, must ensure that the growth of its aviation infrastructure and commercial operations is matched by corresponding improvements in regulatory Oversight, Professional Competency, Accident-Investigation capability and Emergency Preparedness.

47.4 FIP particularly emphasises that pilots, as frontline aviation professionals entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of flights, must be formally represented in the formulation and review of policies affecting Flight Safety and Operational Standards.

47.5 The Federation therefore calls upon the Ministry of Civil Aviation, DGCA, AAIB, airline operators and other Aviation Stakeholders to translate the lessons emerging

from WSOC 2026 into a coordinated, measurable and time-bound programme for strengthening India's aviation safety and crisis-management capabilities.

47.6 **FIP reiterates that aviation safety is not merely a regulatory obligation or an organisational objective. It is a collective responsibility and an uncompromising commitment to protecting human life.**

~~48. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON AVIATION SAFETY & CRISIS MANAGEMENT**~~

~~IATA World Safety & Operations Conference (WSOC) 2026 Istanbul, Türkiye | 06–08 October 2026~~

49. **FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF FIP**

The IATA World Safety & Operations Conference 2026 in Istanbul has reinforced an essential principle: sustainable improvements in aviation safety require the effective integration of **people, technology, operational discipline and internationally accepted safety standards**.

49.1 FIP strongly believes that Aviation Safety cannot be measured merely by the absence of Accidents. It must be assessed through the industry's ability to identify emerging risks, prevent unsafe conditions, respond effectively to emergencies, protect affected individuals and implement meaningful lessons from every occurrence.

49.2 In this context, FIP places particular emphasis on **five fundamental** priorities:

- **Prevention before Investigation**: Greater investment in proactive hazard identification and predictive safety systems.
- **People before Commercial Considerations**: Operational decisions must prioritise the safety and welfare of passengers, crew and ground personnel.
- **Independence in Accident Investigation**: Investigative credibility must be protected through technical competence, institutional independence and transparent evaluation of evidence.
- **Preparedness before Crisis:** Emergency-response capabilities must be regularly tested through realistic simulations and coordinated exercises.
- **Collaboration over Institutional Isolation:** Regulators, airlines, investigators and professional pilot organisations must work collectively towards measurable improvements in aviation safety.

Formation Of National Aviation Safety Advisory Committee

50. FIP further recommends that the Government of India consider constituting a **National Aviation Safety Advisory Committee** comprising representatives from MoCA, DGCA, AAIB, Airline Operators, Airport Authorities, Air Traffic Services and **Professional Aviation Organisations, including FIP.**

50.1 Such a committee to periodically review emerging Aviation Risks, International Safety Developments, Regulatory Effectiveness and the Implementation status of

Safety Recommendations. The IATA World Safety & Operations Conference 2026 reinforces the **importance of integrating human expertise, operational discipline, technological advancement and internationally recognised safety standards. IATA's opening safety statement emphasised that people, technology and standards must function together as a resilient safety system.**

50.2 **Drawing upon these principles, FIP concludes** that India must adopt a more integrated approach to flight operations and cabin safety.

50.3 The Federation places particular **emphasis on six priorities**:

a) **Safety before Commercial Considerations**: Operational efficiency must never compromise flight safety or professional crew judgement.
b) **Protection of Crew Authority**: Pilots and cabin crew must be empowered to exercise their safety responsibilities without inappropriate commercial or administrative pressure.
c) **Scientific Fatigue Management**: Flight crew and cabin crew fatigue must receive greater regulatory attention.
d) **Enhanced Competency-Based Training**: Training must prepare crews for realistic, complex and unforeseen operational emergencies.
e) **Integrated Cockpit–Cabin Coordination**: Pilots and cabin crew must function as a unified safety team.
f) **Proactive Identification of Emerging Risks**: Turbulence, lithium battery incidents, geopolitical disruptions, automation dependency and passenger behaviour require continuous assessment.

50.4 **FIP further recommends that the Ministry of Civil Aviation and DGCA undertake a comprehensive review of existing Flight Operations and Cabin Safety policies** in consultation with airlines, professional pilot organisations, cabin crew representatives and recognised training institutions.

51. Specific Recommendations for the Indian Aviation Industry

FIP proposes the following priority implementation measures.

Priority	Proposed action	Responsible stakeholder
Immediate	National review of airline emergency-response preparedness	DGCA / Airlines
Immediate	Strengthen independent accident-investigation capability	MoCA / AAIB
High	Establish pilot peer-support programmes	DGCA / Airlines
High	Strengthen fatigue-risk oversight	DGCA

High	Conduct coordinated national aviation crisis exercises	MoCA / AAI / Airlines
Medium	Expand predictive safety-data analysis	DGCA / Airlines
Medium	Develop advanced crisis-management training	IATA / Training institutions
Continuous	Include pilot representatives in safety-policy consultations	MoCA /DGCA

52. **Specific Recommendations for India's Aviation Sector**

FIP Proposes the Following Implementation Priorities.

Area	FIP recommendation	Responsible agency
• Flight Crew Fatigue	Strengthen FDTL Oversight and FRMS	DGCA
• Operational safety	Protect PIC authority	DGCA / Airlines
• Pilot training	Expand EBT and Abnormal-scenario Training	DGCA / Airlines
• Cabin safety	Standardise Competency-Based Training	DGCA
• Turbulence	Improve forecasting and Cabin Procedures	Airlines / ATC
• Lithium batteries	Review Carriage and Emergency Procedures	DGCA / Airlines
• Unruly Passengers	Strengthen Prevention and Enforcement	MoCA / BCAS / Airlines
• Medical emergencies	Improve On board Preparedness	Airlines
• Crew coordination	Conduct joint emergency training	Airlines
• Safety reporting	Encourage confidential, non-punitive reporting	DGCA / Airlines

53. FIP CONCLUDING STATEMENT

53.1 The Federation of Indian Pilots welcomes the emphasis placed by the IATA World Safety & Operations Conference 2026 on **strengthening Aviation Safety through Human Performance, Operational Resilience, Technological advancement and International Cooperation**. It firmly believes that safe Flight Operations and effective Cabin Safety are interdependent responsibilities requiring seamless coordination between Pilots, Cabin Crew, Airline Management, Operational Control Centres and Regulatory Authorities.

53.2 As India's Aviation industry continues to expand, it is imperative that operational growth is accompanied by corresponding improvements in Safety Oversight, Crew competency, Fatigue Management, Emergency Preparedness and the Effective Implementation of internationally recognised standards. FIP particularly emphasises that the Pilot-in-Command's authority concerning Flight Safety must remain paramount and that cabin crew must be recognised and empowered as essential aviation safety professionals.

53.4 The Federation recommends that DGCA undertake a comprehensive review of **Flight Operations and Cabin Safety** regulations, incorporating **Evidence-Based Training, Scientific Fatigue-Risk Management, Improved Turbulence procedures, Lithium Battery Fire preparedness, Strengthened Cockpit–Cabin Coordination** and Enhanced Passenger Safety Measures.

53.5 **FIP FURTHER URGES THE MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION TO ENSURE MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OF PROFESSIONAL AVIATION ORGANISATIONS, INCLUDING FIP, IN THE FORMULATION AND REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL SAFETY POLICIES.**

53.6 The Federation reiterates that Aviation Safety cannot be achieved through Regulatory Compliance alone. It requires Professional Competence, Sound Judgement, Effective Coordination, Organisational Accountability and an Uncompromising Commitment to protecting Human life.

FIP's Guiding Principle Remains:

Safe Operations Begin with Empowered Crews, Effective Training and a Safety-First Culture.

Capt. CS Randhawa,

President, FIP

04 Nov 2026

FEDERATION OF INDIAN PILOTS INSTITUTE OF AVIATION & AVIATION SAFETY